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Target - The Elderly:
A Nondiscrimination Perspective
on Daniel Callahan's Setting Limits
by
Robert A. Destro

From: Set No Limits: A Rebuttal to Daniel Callahan's Proposal to Limit
Health Care for the Elderly (Barry & Bradley, eds., Champaign-Urbana: U. ofm.
Press, 1991)
It is a truism that all arguments must begin somewhere, preferably at a point
that would be identified by those engaged in them as "the beginning." Daniel
Callahan's discussion of limiting health care for the elderly, Setting Limits:
Medical Goals in an Aging Society, 1 is a good example of a timely and useful
argument that begins somewhere other than where it should.
On the surface, Setting Limits is an argument for the development of an ethic
governing law and medicine in a society in which the elderly are valued members
of the community. It presents a case for encouraging physicians and their patients
to have a clear sense ofjustice and proportion in the midst oflife's terminal crises.
It envisions a government committed to a transcendent vision of the common
good and imagines a cadre of health-care bureaucrats who will not take
intellectual or practical shortcuts in their well-meaning attempts to get their jobs
done on time and (most importantly) under budget.
To a reader who is reasonably well informed about the medical, legal, and
social ramifications of limiting access to health care, Setting Limits is intriguing
and frustrating. It is intriguing because Callahan's recommendations represent a
serious attempt to grapple with one of the most difficult bioethical and legal
dilemm/lS facing our society. It is frustrating because the ideal world Callahan
proposes as the goal of his argument will never come into being if policy-makers
and families adopt Callahan's operative assUmptions as their own. The reasons
are as stark as they are simple.
In the real world Callahan describes, social value and the common good are
too often measured in starkly political terms. 2 "Little thought is given in medicine
to its ultimate ends" because physicians and patients, and the government upon
which both rely to subsidize them, are more often captivated by technological
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possibilities than by any vision of the just and compassionate in the face of
individual mortality. We live in a society "which in its secular and public guise
professes to have no generally binding moral traditions,"3 and in which attempts
to construct a legal order based in transcendent notions of truth, justice or
morality are likely to be challenged as unconstitutional "contradict[ions of] the
'logic of secular [individual] liberty' " that guides the current majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court.4
Callahan recognizes all of this; that is why Setting Limits is, ultimately, an
open invitation for discussion. The book sketches out an approach - the author
calls it a "trajectory"5 - that he hopes will lead unerringly toward the targeted
goal: an enlightened social policy toward the elderly and the dying.
"Trajectory" is an apt term for Callahan's approach more so, I believe, than he
intended. He has launched an idea and set it hurtling toward an elusive target
called "intergenerational equity." Its inherent concept and design flaws will
assure that it will never reach that goal.
Callahan acknowledges that weaving an integrated social tapestry requires
collective effort and a common set of values.6 He eloquently describes (and
decries) the existing values that seem to govern medical-care decision-making
and accurately views them as one source of our inability to come to grips with the
moral limits of health-care decisions. Finally, he makes his own suggestions
regarding an alternative set of values that should guide individuals in making
judgments about the limits of medical care. For all of this he is to be commended,
even if one does not agree either with his approach or his suggestions.
The problem is that while he decries the present value structure that influences
medical-care decision-making, he makes no effort to demonstrate that his
approach rests on values that are, in any meaningful way, different from those he
rejects as the source of the problem: "the virtues of youth rather than age, the new
rather than the old, self-reliance and autonomy rather than community."7 The
result is predictable.
Like a surface-to-surface missile with a misprogrammed inertial guidance
system, his idea veers off its intended course as it starts downrange and targets the
very individuals Callahan considers to be at risk: the elderly. Given his initial
value judgments and assumptions,S it will be difficult, if not impossible as a
practical matter, for society to attain the intergenerational equity he urges. An
approach centered on the duties ofthe elderly alone9 is more likely to result in an
increasingly overt tendency to justify devaluation of and discrimination against
the elderly and other persons with disabilities.
I make two basic arguments concerning the serious questions raised in Setting
Limits. Both underscore the importance of reaching agreement on fundamentals
before embarking on the always difficult task of formulating a set of social,
medical, or legal policy goals. Callahan's quote from Michael Ignatieff's book,
The Needs of Strangers, captures the point nicely: "woe betide any man who
depends on the abstract humanity of another for his food and protection."10 In
my view, intergenerational equity as proposed in Setting Limits is a potentially
dangerous abstraction unless and until it is complemented by a clearly
articulated vision of the place and value of the elderly and disabled in the
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community at large.
The second argument is that the provision, financing, and rationing of medical
services should be no less subject to scrutiny under the nondiscrimination laws
than any other profit-making, nonprofit, or charitable activity.ll I shall not
quarrel with the fact that at the individual level medical decision-making affects
important personal and familial interests. Nor shall I dispute the inability oflaw
or constitutional principle to lay down fixed standards for the exercise of medical
judgment. The argument here is that neither the personal nor the technical nature
of medical decision-making exempts it from scrutiny intended to determine
whether or not the criteria utilized for making health-care judgments are
consistent with the ultimate goal of nondiscrimination law itself: to do justice and
effectuate the common good.
Thankfully, however, my task here is limited. For present purposes, I shall
leave a discussion of both the limits of autonomy and the substantive content of
integenerationaljustice to those more qualified than I to address such topics. My
topic is nondiscrimination, and the intensely interesting question of how society
sets, marks, and polices the boundaries between the exercise of legitimate
judgment and the practice of illicit discrimination.
Fundamental Questions: Looking for the Starting Point

My first argument is that while Setting Limits raises many of the right
philosophical and moral questions about medical and social goals in a just
society, it analyzes them on the basis of a set of assumed principles that appear to
be fundamentally at odds with the natural rights philosophy that undergirds both
the civil order under which we live and Callahan's basic ethical argument about
the necessity to accept nature's limits on the human lifespan. I propose to
demonstrate why this is so by posing a series of questions.
Why the Elderly?

Perhaps the most basic question is why Setting Limits is about the elderly.
Callahan answers that he wrote the book "because some significant change in
our thinking about health care for the elderly is needed" and that he wanted to
start a "long-term discussion" that would address the ancient question: how
much is enough?12
But why the elderly? One can, and perhaps all of us should, ask the question
"how much is enough?" far more often and in far more circumstances than we
usually do, but why should the elderly be singled out for special consideration
here?
If the question is "how much is enough?" it is equally relevant to ask it in the
case of any patient, elderly or not, who has, based on Callahan's thesis about the
ethical limits of health care, arguably "had enough." In his zeal to urge society to
pay more attention to the question of intergenerational equity, Callahan has
unjustifiably narrowed the appropriate scope of the question from "how much is
enough?" to "how much is enough for an elderly person?"
The reason for limiting the argument to the elderly appear to be fourfold:
August, 1992

57

first, the geometric increase in the number of elderly persons; second, the virtual
certainty that many, of not inost, will suffer from either chronic illness or
age-related disability (or both) prior to their deaths; third, the increasing isolation
and loneliness of many elders; and fourth, that these developments already
involve enormous human and social costs that will only increase with the
~e of time.13
All of this is true. But it still begs the question "why the elderly?" It is
absolutely critical to establish at the outset whether the problem is to be defined
as the elderly themselves, their excessive demands for health care, or the
generally excessive demand for health care brought about by this society's
tendency to view "medicine . . . as a means of trying to cure or control the
problems of life."14
If Callahan is correct that the elderly mirror commonly held societal
perceptions about the role of medicine, Callahan's exclusive focus on the
excessive demand for medical care by the elderly is difficult to justify. And if the
goal of Setting Limits is to lay a foundation for discussion of the ends of health
care, including equity and justice for all who seek medical care (including those
who cannot afford it), Callahan's focus must be broadened to include a
discussion of society's vision ofjustice and the common good. In short, the role of
the elderly in attaining intergenerational equity is an important part of the
inquiry, but reference to the obligations of others is necessary, too - unless, of
course, we are to assume that the elderly themselves are the problem.
Callahan seems to want it both ways. Even though he strenuously argues that
the elderly should not be devalued, his ·express arguments and the logic from
which they are derived squarely target them for special treatment. A prime
example is the suggestion that insulin be denied to elderly patients with "mild
impairment of competence."IS Since Callahan rightly decries the danger that
excessive individualism and self-absorption pose in high-cost, high-technology
medicine, there is something incongruous about this suggestion. Insulin therapy
is neither high-cost nor high-technology medicine; it is routine therapy for a
chronic condition that affects both children and adults.
The conclusion is inescapable: Setting Limits is not about excessive
individualism and self-absorption, both of which lead inevitably to inequitable
demands on the health-care system. The book is about dependent persons
(primarily elderly), their place in community and family, ''the meaning and
significance of old age" in a society with an "absence of a public philosophy on
the meaning of aging,"16 and the problems dependent and disabled persons
create in a society that values individualism, personal autonomy, youth, and
vigor.
What Do We Owe the Elderly?

This is the central question of the book, for Callahan is certainly correct in
noting that "if the elderly lack an established, coherent and meaningful place in
life and society, there is no real rationale for their protection" in a secular society;
"it merely exists as a kind of sentimental beneficence."17 I agree that it is essential
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that this question be posed directly, free ofthe" 'evasion, disguise, temporizing
[and] deception by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the
appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict.' "18 But even this formulation
manages to evade the moral dilemma. Allocation methods are but one way to
resolve the question. Another way is to focus on the elderly alone, without
explicit regard for the manner in which such a focus will resonate in a culture he
condemns.
To be sure, Callahan recognizes the "possibilities for moral mischief'19 in both
Setting Limits and in its recently published sequel, What Kind ofLife: The Limits
ofMedical Progress. In the latter, he answers the questions "why the elderly?" as
follows: "In attempting to provide ever-improved health care for the elderly, we
are on the greatest, and most extensive, of medicine's many frontiers of progress.
[Setting Limits] was as much a study of how to respond to such a frontier as it was
a book about the elderly . .. . It is quite true that it is our whole system that is in
turmoil, not just our attempt to provide for those who are aged."20
What Kind of Life underscores the importance of an inquiry into the general
nature and extent of social obligation to those with medical needs. If the aim of
Callahan's overall project is "to set forth an alternative way of thinking about
health that will lead into the devising of a reasonable and just health-care system
[. . . which is] deeply rooted in a plausible understanding of the human condition
and ... coherent, feasible, and humane in its practical policy implications," then
the "trajectory" problems in Setting Limits arise from its focus on the elderly and
what they can expect from others in the community.21
It makes no difference that "we begin [the discussion] in media res, in the
middle of the story, with a hard, deeply ingrained set of values, a complex set of
institutions, and a bewildering array of mores, folkways, interests, and
predilections already in place [that] will not be easy to change."22 As long as there
is agreement on fundamentals (i.e., the ultimate starting point of the total
inquiry), it makes no difference that a particular discussion starts in the middle:
the goal will determine the range of possible trajectories. If the starting points are
different - and they are - there can be no agreement on process until there is
common ground for discussion.
Unlike Callahan, I do not believe that "we [as a society] lack good moral and
cultural resources" to resolve these value questions.23 The moral and cultural
resources are as available now as they ever were. 24 The question is whether those
in positions of authority and influence, like Callahan himself, have the insight
and courage to draw upon those resources explictly and to use them to examine
"the possibilities for moral mischief' inherent in their own perspectives. Such an
examination should be complete before any attempt is made to "reform" what
are quite accurately described as a "bewildering array of mores, folkways,
interests, and predilections already in place."
It is precisely because Callahan suggests a change in the terms of the debate
that a brief review of one of the more important sources of the "mores, folkways,
interests and predilections" in American society - civil rights law - is in order.
The law is both a component and a reflection of the "moral and cultural
resources" of a society. An examination of "the ethics of equal protection"
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highlights the essential soundnesS of Callahan's indictment of "an unlimited
quest for individualistic pleasure" and underscores the danger of his narrowly
targeted approach. .
Age, Disability, and Civil Rights: The Ethics oj Equal Protection

Duty and Its Relevance to Civil Rights
Duty is not a topic that receives much attention in contemporary American
civil rights discourse. From the beginning, the concept of equal protection of the
laws was described by the U.S. Supreme Court as "a positive immunity or right,"
a claim particularly valuable to its intended beneficiaries, the newly freed
slaves.25 The debate over the character of the equal protection guarantee26 rages
in similar terms today,27 with no apparent end in sight. 28
The conceptual shortsightedness of a rights-based approach to equal
protection has complicated many, if not most, discussions of issues such as
affirmative action and the development of standards to govern discrimination on
the basis of age and disability. The reason is simple: rights claims are assertions
that collective interests are limited when they limit individual liberty and
autonomy. The claims made by dependent persons on the community are
qualitatively different. Thus, I begin this argument with a basic proposition:
Duty, no right, is the organizing concept behind the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.
In most discussions relating to the nature of individual liberties, the central
concern is whether the personal interest in question can be characterized as a
ma!ter of right, that is, shall the individual be at liberty to seek enjoyment of the
clauned interest without governmental or private interference? Although the
resolution of such claims involves an inevitable balancing and subordination of
one set of interests to another, the sum total of governmental obligation is to
refrain from acting in a manner that will deprive a person of the asserted right.29
We therefore speak, quite correctly, in terms of a "right" to freedom of speech
and a "right" to religious liberty.
The constitutional and legal guarantees of equal protection are different; they
require more than simple restraint from interference in another's liberty; their
function is to require that governments and individuals conform their behavior
to a legally and socially acceptable standard.30 The liberties of speaking or
publishing freely can exist whether others listen or read.
Thus, while the goal of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
law is equal enjoyment ofthe blessings ofliberty, its foundation is a behavioral
obligation. To state that all persons are entitled to "equal protection of the laws"
is to express a social duty on the part of government that has been codified as a
matter of constituionallaw. 31 Although the courts have generally rejected claims
that liberty-based rights claims presuppose affirmative community obligations to
support the full enjoyment of those liberties by anyone,32 there is considerably
more sympathy for such claims in the equal protection context,33 especially
where the claimants are in a condition of dependency.34
It is particularly relevant to note that American law has only recently added
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the elderly and persons with disabilities to those deemed to be at risk from the
antisocial behavior of others. In part, this development is attributable to
demographic change - an increase in the number, health , and mobility of
elderly and disabled persons - due to the advances in health care addressed in
Selling Limits. Equally important, however, is the gradual acceptance of the
proposition that reason rather than prejudice must govern public policy affecting
persons with disabilities. 35
But precisely because accommodating an elder or a person with a disability
requires more than merely a fair application of a set of neutral criteria, consensus
concerning the nature and extent of affirmative community obligations remains
fragile. 36
What Duty -

and to Whom? Of Potential and Personhood

The basic question explored in Selling Limits is what is the extent of our duty
- as a society and as individuals - to the elderly? Although expressed as a
single question in most instances,37 the structure of this question throughout
Callahan's inquiry obscures the fact that this question has two parts: first, "what
duty?" (the scope of the obligation); and second, "to whom is it owed?" (its
object).38 For this discussion, I will address the questions in reverse order.
To Whom Is the Duty Owed? Although Callahan and I approach both the
nature and scope of duty in the health-care setting quite differently, we agree that
the basic issue is one of duty. Our first, and most important, difference lies in our
respective views concerning the people who are the subject of Selling Limits: the
objects of society'S duty.
Callahan's approach combines the questions of object and scope into a
lengthy discussion about specific circumstances in which society should reach
agreement about the limits of health care. This has the effect of making the scope
of even the most basic legal duty of the state - to protect each member of the
community from harm - depend upon the characteristics of the person to be
protected. I speak simply in terms of the duty of those in authority to offer all
persons an equal, basic level of protection. 39
Since the Constitution speaks in terms of a duty to provide protection to all
persons on an equal basis, the source of our difference in perspective must be in
our respective answers to the question: "who is a person?" Who are those
members of the community to whom society collectively owes a duty to provide
equal protection of the laws? Because Selling Limits is intended as an invitation
for discussion of medical and social goals in ajust society, the first clue that there
is a programming error in Callahan's trajectory is apparent as soon as his answer
to this question is examined.
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that Callahan and I do not
disagree over the legitimacy of debating the standards under which decisions will
be made concerning the extent and relative priority of duties alleged to be in
conflict in any medical setting. Problems of priority and degree are implicit in
virtually every ethical dilemma: medical and social ethics are no different.
Discussions of extent and priority of treatment in a medical setting presuppose
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the existence of more basic duties to the patient. Raising the question of
personhood changes the nature of the discussion because it challenges the
existence of even these basic duties. Where the subject of discussion is a person,
the nature of the ethical, moral, and legal duty is qualitatively different from that
in which the object of the duty is not. 40
Callahan seeks to soften the significance of a discussion of personhood by
stating in advance that "the crucial potentialities for personhood" present "a
complex and controversial question."41 Given that the question of personhood is
another way of asking who shall be considered a member of the community,
such a concession is more important for what it leaves unstated than for what it
says (which is not much).
The implicit message is that there are indeed some individuals now considered
to be members of the community who might be better thought of as outsiders
(i.e ., as dead people) for purposes of public policy. Thus, not only is the
substantive question ~ who is a person? ~ "complex and controversial," but so
is the implicit assumption that the community has the right to define any of its
living members as outsiders. Callahan, however, simply assumes the
appropriateness of both questions in the context of the discussion, states three
potentialities he considers crucial, and proceeds to construct the entire
argumentative edifice of Setting Limits around them.
From Callahan's perspective, membership in the community turns upon (l)
the potential capacity to reason; (2) the potential to have emotions; and (3) the
potential to enter into relationships with others. A person who has lost all these
capacities cannot, in a way meaningful to Callahan, be called a "person" any
longer, or be said to have a "biographical life" remaining.42
Cases once thought difficult, such as In re Conroy, 43 Matter of Jobes, 44 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth, 45 become easier through the
magic of redefinition. An individual in a persistent vegetative state is no longer a
person, but "a being." The nature of social duty changes because the object of
that duty is no longer a member of the human community. The duty of
protection that is owed a person in law and morality has vanished, and in its
place exists only the duty to act with "the respect due human bodies prior to
clinical death."46
That this is a "a complex and controversial" approach is obvious, but that
commentators ha ve not appeared to notice its importance is disturbing. Callahan
suggests that individuals who are not dead under any of the relevant clinical
criteria are to be treated as if they were dead. Members of the community who
are nearly, but not quite, dead become "bodies" because they lack "the crucial
potentialities for personhood."
Such a concept of personhood is far too narrow. It defines personhood in
terms of "crucial potentialities" and makes the otherwise absolute duty of law
and society to provide equal protection for individuals contingent on their
natural ability.47 Under Callahan's approach, only those without disabilities are
assured equal legal protection from harm.
Keeping in mind that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect
all who were, by their nature, human,48 it is appropriate to examine Callahan's
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ability-based construct with a view toward determining whether it is consistent
with his own argument that nature itself provides the most relevant criteria for
decision-making (i.e., a natural lifespan). The inherent inconsistencies in
Callahan's approach become clear when one examines not the comparative level
of protection to be afforded the elderly (although that is instructive, too), but his
treatment of the elderly themselves.
The Significance of Age: Disability and "Potential" Under Callahan's
approach, society owes persons with disabilities very little. That which it does
owe appears to be related to the type of disability and inversely proportional to
the degree to which it affects the key potentialities. This much is clear from the
trajectory elaborated throughout the book. But even in the case of the "physically
vigorous elderly person," Callahan would support withholding care. 49
Given his focus on potential and intergenerational equity, there is no
theoretical problem for Callahan here: age itself is a disability in that the
"natural" lifespan operates inexorably to limit the potential of elderly people.
There is, however, a practical objection to operationalizing such a suggestion.
Callahan "do[es] not think anyone would find it tolerable to allow a healthy
[elderly] person to be denied lifesaving care. 50
Quite so, and it is revealing that Callahan does not inquire as to the reasons for
such "intolerance"; for he might just find evidence of the "moral and cultural
resources" he alleges are lacking in contemporary society. My own suspicion is
that society is morally and culturally unprepared at present either to write off
those who "deteriorate" or become disabled, or to treat persons who are not dead
as if they were. 51
It is significant that, although it is the centerpiece of his entire argument about
intergenerational equity, Callahan never defines the term "potential." This
omission is important for several reasons. First, it converts intergenerational
equity into a dangerous abstraction. Second, the duties such an equitable
principle would impose seem to depend entirely on the undefined "potential" of
the person whose contribution is expected. And third, the only real difference
between persons with disabilities and the elderly are their respective ages. For
both groups, life "potential" appears to be that which others are willing, given the
- nature and extent of their particular disability, to attribute to them;
technologically assisted potential has already been ruled out.
This is the real significance of Callahan's three "crucial potentialities for
personhood." The potential capacity to reason, to have emotions, and to enter
into relationships with others cannot logically be limited to the elderly. In fact,
the case for denying treatment to a young person without much potential for
reason, emotion, and relationships would be even stronger under Callahan's
logic than it would be for elderly patients with "mild impairment[s] of
competence"52 or to unborn children. Elderly patients with mild impairments
of competence have actual (although limited) capacity to reason, they have
some, if not all, of their natural capacity to experience emotions, and actual
(although again perhaps limited) capacity to enter into relationships with others.
Unborn children have immense capacity for all three,53 assuming they are
allowed to be born.
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Nevertheless, Callahan suggests that the intergenerational equity proposed in
Setting Limits requires that only the elderly should be denied treatment. Such
equity would prefer the young patient with potential (perhaps a poet) who
suffers, for example, from end-stage HIV infection (AIDS) in the allocation of
medical resources. If this person should have access to expensive, hightechnology medical treatment in an effort to prevent or retard the inexorable
result of the disease because of an assumed potential, what then should be the
societal response to another person with severe AIDS-related dementia? If there
is to be a choice, on what basis will it be made? Age or potential? The answer to
that question would have to be potential, however defined (probably politically).
A grandmother who has diabetes and (arguably) no potential because she is old
will get nothing, not even insulin. She loses on both counts, no matter how much
actual potential she has remaining.
And thus we return to the starting point of this discussion: the ethics of the
equal protection guarantee. If, as Richard John Neuhaus has said, our
jurisprudence of civil rights holds that "human rights are coterminous with the
individual's ability to claim and exercise such rights,"54 the law is in a difficult
position indeed. By its very terms the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes a duty to provide protection regardless of one's capacity to
demand it.
The conclusion is inescapable: despite Callahan's strenuous arguments and
exhortations to the contrary, accceptance of his related concepts of a "natural"
lifespan and a "tolerable death"55 as a matter of public policy will inevitably
result in the discrimination against and devaluation of the elderly he fears.
Because both concepts proceed from implicit assumptions about the requisites of
a "good life" and the potential one must have to be a person, they can also serve
as the intellectual basis or justification for discrimination against persons of any
age who have severe disabilities.

What Duty and How Much? Of Nature and Extent
Nondiscrimination Generally. The law governing discrimination on the basis
of handicap, disability, and age is developing rapidly. Federal law requires that
any federally funded program or activity must refrain from discriminating
against an "otherwise handicapped" individual "solely on the basis of his
handicap."56 Many state and local laws provide similar protection. The newly
enacted Americans with Disabilities Act 5? will effectively bring persons with
disabilities under the full protection of the civil rights laws in employment,
transportation, and public accommodations, including hospitals and health-care
facilities. 58 The coverage of law governing discrimination on the basis of age is
also expanding. 59 Without attempting a detailed analysis of current federal case
law on the related, but distinct, topics of disability and age discrimination, it
seems clear that the trend in enacted and decisional law governing both the
elderly and persons with disabilities is to treat them with greater, not lesser,
respect and concern.
These are welcome trends, for they reflect not only the law's increasing
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awareness that the number of elderly Americans is growing, but also an
increasing societal affirmation of the natural rights ethic under which neither age
nor disability should serve as a morally or socially adequate basis for denying
equality before the law. The law correctly requires more narrowly tailored
justifications for treating individuals as outsiders in their own community.
Age, Disability, and Capacity. For the purposes of this essay, it is useful to
consider discrimination on the basis of age and disability as related rather than
separate categories. The central inquiry in both cases is twofold: individual
capacity, and the extent of the duty to accommodate.
In a series of cases expanding on the meaning of federal laws governing the
rights of persons with disabilities, the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out that
Congress was motivated by two concerns: to protect the handicapped from the
intentionally disciminatory acts of others 60 and to eliminate what might be called
"benign neglect" based on "thoughtlessness and indifference."61
Setting Limits, by contrast, is both thoughtful and thought-provoking. The
standards Callahan proposes are active ones, although they will operate in a
medical milieu in which "benign neglect" based on "thoughtlessness and
indifference" remains all too common with respect to the treatment of persons
with disabilities.62 For practical purposes, this means that the exercise of
discretion to deny treatment must be closely monitored.
Regulating Medical and Social Discretion in an Age ofLimits. We now reach
my second argument: health-care decision-making, including the exercise of
judgment by medical personnel, is not exempt from regulation in the public
interest. Callahan agrees. Decisions to end life, whether voluntary or not, are not
simply private matters. Society can and should demand medically and socially
legitimate reasons for health-care decision-making.
On what basis are we to determine the extent of the duty to provide medical
care? The answer is easily framed in the negative: the extent of duty must not
depend solely on the patient's age or level of disability. This is not because the
law forbids makingjudgments on these grounds - in fact, it all too often permits
them 63 - but rather because neither age nor disability alone is a demonstrably
legitimate standard for medical or health-care decision-making by physicians or
anyone else, especially government.
In my view, the selection of age or disability (i.e., potential) 'as the primary
standard for allocating scarce medical resources is unjust. Because it is also
unreasonable to take the position that the physical characteristics of patients are
irrelevant to the medical-care decision-making process, the real question is: what
weight should age and disability be given in that process? My answer is precisely
the opposite of Callahan's.
Callahan correctly points out that there is a distinction between medical and
moral decision-making. The problem, as he sees it, is that traditional medicalcare decision-making treats age as a physical factor influencing technical
judgment. His proposal is that it should be viewed as an appropriate moral factor
as wel1. 64 Given that Callahan's argument is a moral one, this is a logical
suggestion. Given its legal implications if accepted, it is appropriate to examine it
in light of the legal duties governing professional service providers.
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Since the nature of a relationship generally governs the legal and ethical duties
that inhere in it, the focus here will be on the kind of relationship established
between the decision-makers and the individual to whom they owe a professional
duty. Lawyers, for example, have duties that are both technical and ethical and
these arise both from the nature of their relationship with their clients and from
their position as officers of the court. 65 The same can be said for parents and
families: legal and moral duties arise from the nature of the familial or parental
relationship. The duties of medical professionals have similar legal and moral
roots.
When the law undertakes to scrutinize the legitimacy of professional
behavior, the inquiry is necessarily broad: the action, decision, or proposal is to
be viewed in the context of the professional relationship and community in
which it takes place. The burden and allocation of proof in professional
malpractice and civil rights cases proceeds in this fashion.
The purpose of Setting Limits is to suggest standards for the exercise of
medicaljudgment. 66 That social consequences flow from medicaljudgments is a
given , but at the basic decision-making level the first consideration is always
technical: "can it be done?" Callahan's focus in Setting Limits is the ethically
necessary second step of the decision-making process: "should it be done under
the circumstances?" To this point, Callahan and I agree that "the problem [at this
stage] is distinguishing between medical and moraljudgment."67 We differ from
this point onward because Callahan fails to take his own advice.
The purpose of medical-care and decision-making is medical, that is, to affect
the physical or mental condition of individual patients, including the relief or
palliation of pain. Whatever decision is made will have moral consequences as
well, but the character of the decision remains medical. The question posed in
Selling Limits is whether the moral issue will be addressed directly and, in
Callahan's own words, free of the "evasion, disguise, temporizing [and]
deception by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the appearance
of failing to reconcile values in conflict."68 The conflict of values becomes
apparent only after the question is first correctly identified as one of medica!'
judgment. Only then are the important moral consequences seen in context.
This is where the trajectory sketched out in Setting Limits misses the mark. In
his zeal to condemn the trend toward greater and greater individual freedom of
choice in medical matters, Callahan entirely ignores the question of personal
responsibility. Whether the decision is made at the individual or at the societal
level through allocation of resources,69 the decision-maker bears personal, moral
responsibility for every decision . This means that whatever decision is made
must be explained, and that the person or entity making the decision must be
prepared not only to defend the explanation, but also to justify the source of his,
her, or its competence to make it in the first place.
I would argue that civil rights law has already rejected Callahan's argument
that doctors - or legislatures, for that matter - should be making moral
judgments about the protection to be afforded entire classes of persons. The law
requires that medical judgments, like other professional judgments, be made on
the basis of medical rather than social criteria. Otherwise, there is no effective
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standard for review.
To the extent that age or disability is demonstrably relevant to medical
decision-making, both are legitimate criteria for the exercise of medical
judgment, both technical ("can it be done?") and ethical ("will it serve its
intended purpose in these circumstances?"). The same is true respecting moral or
social judgments concerning the relevance of age and disability as criteria that
define the nature of one's relationship to the larger social community and the
reciprocal duties that flow from it. While age or disability is sometimes relevant
to one's ability to participate meaningfully in all aspects of the life of a
community (e.g., voting, driving a car, viewing art exhibits), neither should ever
be relevant to membership in the community in the first place. The touchstone
for the legitimacy of using such factors depends on what one wants to use them
for. This is the problem with Callahan's book.
The real question posed by Callahan in Setting Limits is this: "even though
some treatments are technically feasible and will likely serve their intended
purpose, should they nevertheless be denied to persons on the basis of age?"
There is no easy answer to this question, but Setting Limits suggests two
responses, both of which are equally evasive of the critical moral question of
when the duty stops.
Neither a redefinition of the operative content of society'S concept of the
person nor the elaboration of an abstract concept of intergenerational equity
provides an adequate response. Both seek to resolve a difficult moral dilemma by
placing the focus on the individual for whom the treatment is sought. Neither
addresses the issue of duty directly. If the duty can be avoided either because the
patient is no longer to be considered a member of the community or because the
elder can be accused of overstepping the bounds of intergenerational equity, then
we will never reach the truly difficult question of how to balance our collective
commitment to individual rights against our equally important (but far less
considered) individual duty to refrain from making inequitable claims on the
community. It is sad that the increasing cost of medical services has brought us to
the brink of considering the elderly and the disabled as obstacles to social
cohesiveness and progress, but, given our fixation on indiviudal rights and our
devotion to the cult of youth, it is not surprising. Old people simply get in the
way.
Thus, the legal question that must be answered by Callahan is: for what
purpose did you focus on the elderly and potential of those from whom you
would withhold care? What is the end for which the suggested classification is to
be used?70

Rethinking the Role of Autonomy
Is Autonomy the Basis of Community Membership?
We have now come full circle, to what might be considered the launchpad of
Callahan's intended trajectory. What is the real reason for using age and
age-related disability as a limit on health care? Although my full answer would
require another paper, I here propose a brief answer.
August, 1992

67

Although Setting Limits may represent the first crack in the intellectual
foundation of Callahan's view of individual rights, the capacity to act
autonomously, that is, to reason, to have one's own emotions, and to form
relationships, is the essence of one's humanity. Adopted as a key assumption of a
public law, which rests on a natural rights view of the primacy and worth of the
individual, the result is that the individualism condemned in Setting Limits
replaces the more duty-based natural rights principles found in the Declaration of
Independence and preamble to the Constitution of the United States as the
foundation of public law. (This is especially true in what is known in constitutionallaw as the right to privacy.) Since autonomy is the ultimate personal right,
dependency necessarily becomes the ultimate juridical and social tragedy. The
social dying process has already begun, and for those with severe disabilities
social death has already occurred. This is why one can treat a person in a
persistent vegetative state as "[a] human bod[y] prior to clinical death."7! Those
who are no longer autonomous are simply "being[s],"72 not people. This is why,
in my judgment, it is fair to state that Callahan's actual subject is the rationing of
health care on the basis of age and disability.
Although we approach the subject from very different starting points,
Callahan and I thus agree that setting appropriate limits on personal autonomy is
the great missing link in recent discussions of the rights of competent patients."73
However, I would go one step further - and, implicitly, so does Callahan - to
raise the ultimate question: do rights of autonomy and privacy even exist if their
exercise is inconsistent with either justice or the common good? Thomas
Jefferson gave us a hint when he expressed his conviction that man "has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties. "74
Callahan is quite correct that even as the clamor continues for greater and
greater freedom of choice in medical matters, the choices presented often amount
to little more than a discussion of the merits or demerits of a given technological
intervention. Moral concerns have given way to technological ones: "what can be
done medically ought to be done."75 Individual wants take precedence over
human need.
That personal responsibility in matters of medical care has been ceded to a
small army of medical professionals, lawyers, bureaucrats, cost-accountants, and
sundry social engineers, including the U.S. Supreme Court,76 cannot be denied.
What is at issue is my contention that these surrogates have been invited (if not
encouraged) to play the game strictly "by the numbers," and that Callahan's basic
argument lends support to this trend. Only two questions are generally relevant to
government officials in Washington and elsewhere: (1) who gets the money? (2)
who is in charge? The political and practical truth is that whoever controls the
money will be in charge.
A Suggested Approach: Social Duty and Personal Responsibility
Read together, the recent developments in the law of both aging and disability
noted above stand for the proposition that the elderly and disabled are entitled, at
a minimum, to equal treatment whenever they stand to receive the intended
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benefits of services offered to those without disabilities. Phrased another way, the
burden is on those who would deny needed services to the elderly to do so on
grounds demonstrably related to the individual case.
Thus, for equal protection purposes, there is no necessary connection between
age per se and providing a lesser degree oflegal protection or public services: age
is both an over- and underinclusive classification. The same is true with respect to
disability. Ultimately, the question is whether the most basic of public goods
(protection from harm at the hands of others) will be apportioned on the basis of
actual or presumed individual capacity. In my view, capacity cannot be the
measure of membership in the community.
But none of this reaches the heart of Callahan's question "how much is
enough?" I cannot answer that question, and I would argue strongly that society
should not attempt to do so either. This question is, in fact, a question of duty; and
the answer depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. "How much is
enough?" is an impossible question to answer at the societal level.
What I can say is that before asking questions of broad social import, it is
appropriate to focus on personal responsibility. The law is well equipped to
scrutinize the legitimacy of the reasons given by individuals for their decisions.
That they are personal (in the none-of-your-business sense) or medical (in the
technical sense) makes little difference: patients, their families, medical
professionals, bureaucrats, and legislators have arrogated to themselves a piece of
a huge social program. Decisions that affect others must, at a minimum, be
explained.

Conclusion
Callahan rightly questions the inevitable clash between claims for autonomy
and the goal of setting limits on health care. Autonomy can be limited in only four
basic ways: (1) exhortation (teaching) leading to self-control; (2) eliminating it
altogether in certain instances (rationing); (3) limiting the class of persons who
will be permitted to make valid claims (redefining personhood); or (4)
moderating it with a competing operative principle of social relations (a social
duty approach).
If rationing is necessary due to lack of resources and the legitimacy of
competing demands, exhortation is out and a choice will be necessary from
among the final two. But what choice? If individual autonomy is the highest value
and there is no inclination to limit it as an operative principle of law and social
relations (thus requiring otherwise autonomous individuals to justify some of
their private choices), the logical (and most cost-effective) place to start is with
those who are not autonomous. When the savings at that stage are exhausted, the
next logical step is to consider potential (natural lifespan) and fairness (tolerable
death) as criteria for rationing. Given the starting point and the desired target
(rationing), the trajectory is obvious.
This is what is wrong with Callahan's trajectory. It scores a direct hit on those
whom he claims to value, rather than upon the self-absorption he decries as the
source of the problem. In my view, the advocates of Callahan's Setting Limits
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approach fail for the simple and wise observation made by the cartoon character
Pogo: "We have met the Enemy and it is US!"77 The wisdom of Jefferson's
observation that there is no natural right in opposition to social duty has yet to be
disproved, even if it remains unpopular at the moment. Striking a balance
between autonomy and duty is always a delicate task, but Setting Limits is as
good an argument as any about why we should get about the task as soon as
possible. Excluding anyone, including the elderly, from the community simply
will not do.
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